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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FRANK V. COLOMBO, JR., a minor,
by VIRGINIA VON STORCH, as
Guardian of his Person and Estate,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

(

Case No

(

12292

WALKER BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Respondent
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was instituted by plaintiff to seek reversal
of the rejection of a creditor's claim against the Estate of
Frank V. Colombo, Sr., by respondent Walker Bank and
Trust Company.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower Court entered a Decree of no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner seeks a determination by this Court that the
Decree of the lower Court was erroneous and should be reversed.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On the 15th day of February 1969, Frank V.
Colombo died intestate at Freeport, Grand Bahamas, Bahamas (Judgment Roll, page 1).
2. On March 4, 1969, the District Court in and for
Carbon County, duly entered its Order appointing Walker
Bank and Trust Company Administrator of the Estate of
Frank V. Colombo, Deceased, and Letters of Administration
were duly issued to Walker Bank and Trust Company on
that date (Judgment Roll, page 1).
3. By Order of said Court, on March 26, 1969, the
plaintiff herein was duly appointed as Guardian of the Person and of the Estate of Frank V. Colombo, Jr., a minor
child of Frank V. Colombo, Deceased, and the plaintiff herein. Letters of Guardianship were duly issued and the plaintiff herein has since that date and now is the Guardian of
the Person and the Estate of Frank V. Colombo, Jr. (Judgment Roll, page 1).
4. On the 15th day of November, 1966, by virtue of
a Decree of Divorce, Civil No. 9231, entered in the District
Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, plaintiff was
awarded Judgment against defendant Frank V. Colombo,
Deceased, for the support and maintenance of the minor
child of the parties, Frank V. Colombo, Jr., in the sum of
$150.00 per month to commence with the month of November 1966 and to continue until further Order of the Court
(Defendant's Exhibit 1, paragraph 3).
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5. Under the terms of the Decree, Frank V. Colombo,
Deceased, paid plaintiff support money for Frank V.
Colombo, Jr., his son, up to and including the month of his
death, February 1969 (TR-20).
6. On the 12th day of May 1969, plaintiff duly presented to defendant a claim of $15,150.00, but defendant
refused to allow the same, and on the 10th day of July 1969,
rejected the claim (Defendant's Exhibit 3).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT AN OBLIGATION OF CHILD SUPPORT PROVIDED FOR IN A DECREE OF DIVORCE GRANTING CHILD SUPPORT UNTIL
"FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT" SURVIVES AS A CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE
OF DR. FRANK V. COLOMBO, DECEASED.
It is well settled by a long line of decisions throughout
the United States that the liability of a father is not terminated by his death and that a Divorce Court has the
power to make child support a continuing obligation which
shall survive against his estate as to subsequently accruing
installments. 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce & Separation §856,
page 972; 27B C. J. S. Divorce §323 (f), page 729; Newman
V. Burwell, 15 P. 2d 511 (Calif. 1932); Taylor v. George,
212 P. 2d 505 (Calif., 1949).
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A provision in the Decree of Divorce against a father
for the payment of a certain sum monthly "until further
Order of the Court" creates a non-dischargeable obligation
against the estate of the deceased father. 24 Am. Jur. 2d
Divorce & Separation §856, page 972, 18 A. L. R. 2d, pages
1133-1135.
In Utah, the leading and most recent case directly in
point is Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 P. 1010, 1011
(Utah, 1898), in which the court stated:
"Whether or not the divorced wife and minor children, or any of them, are entitled to have the payment of alimony or money for their support continue after the death of the deceased, depends on
the nature and terms of the Decree allowing the
same.
The children during their minority had no other
recourse against their father or his estate for support than that provided in the Decree unless by
the Order of the Court."
At page 1012, the Court quoted the applicable statute. Section 2606, Comp. Laws Utah, 1888:
"Provided, further, that when it shall appear to the
Court at a future time, that it would be for the interest of the parties concerned that a change should
be effected in regard to the former disposal of children or distribution of property, the Court shall have
power to make such change as will be conducive to
the best interests of all parties concerned."
This statute bears close similarity to the currently applicable Utah statute, Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1953:
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"Such subsequent changes or new orders may be
made by the Court with respect to the disposal of
the children or the distribution of property as shall
be reasonable and proper."
In discussing Section 2606, the Court stated at page
1012:
"The Court may make such order respecting the
property and the support and maintenance of the
wife and children, as is just and equitable, and such
Order or Decree may be made to continue in force
after his decease; and the Court may afterwards, if
occasion shall require it, make such change in any
Decree as 'will be conductive to the best interest of
all parties concerned.' "
The Court concluded by stating :
"We cannot sanction appellants' contention. It is
unsound as being at variance not only with the Decrees of the Court and the law, but also with justice;
for it is the solemn duty of every husband and
father to support his wife during life, and his children during their minority, suitably to their station
in life, and if he fails to do so, every principle of
justice demands that they be thus supported out of
his estate."
The doctrine of Murphy v. Moyle, that a claim against
a deceased parent's estate for continuing child support can
be maintained, has been cited in many decisions in other
states.
In a leading California case, Newman V. Burwell, 15 P.
2d 511 (Calif., 1932), the court stated at page 512:
"Decedent's obligation to pay this particular sum
during his lifetime arose out of . . . the Decree of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
Divorce . . . Upon the death of decedent this portion
of plaintiff's claim when duly presented or filed
became a charge upon the estate payable out of the
assets thereof."
The Court went on to stats at 512 that:
'They, (Murphy case and others) . . . indubitably
establish that a father's obligation to support his
minor child . . . survives his death . . . and that an
action . . . may be brought to establish the same as
a valid claim . . . against the father's estate. It is
true that in certain of the cited cases, the father's
obligation was to pay the designated sum monthly
during the minority of the child, thus tending to
irrefutably indicate that it was to survive the father,
whereas the obligation here imposed was to continue
'until further order of the Court'. However these
same authorities recognize that in the absence of an
expressed intention to limit such obligation to the
lifetime of the father, the same will, and does, survive his death, even under a Decree imposing the
same until 'further order of the Court.' "
The California courts again interpreted similar provisions
in In Re Goulart's Estate, 32 Cal. Rpt. 229, 231 (D. C. 1st
Dist., Calif., 1963), wherein the court in quoting from Taylor V. George, 212 P. 2d 505 (Calif., 1949), said:
"In California the rule is that the obligation of a
father to support his minor child which is fixed by
Divorce Decree . . . does not cease upon the father's
death, but survives as a charge against his estate."
In Hill V. Matthews, 416 P. 2d 144 (N. M., 1966), the
Supreme Court of New Mexico was faced with this question
for the first time and in referring to Murphy v. Moyle and
other decisions, they concluded at page 146:
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"We conclude that where a father has been ordered
by a court of competent jurisdiction to make child
support payments until his child reaches majority,
in accord with a stipulation such as was present in
this case, and thereafter the father dies while the
child is yet a minor, that a claim may be successfully
prosecuted in the probate court against the estate
of the father to enforce the payment."
In Edelman v. Edelman, 199 P. 2d 840 (Wyo., 1948),
the court noted at page 843, that the Decree of Divorce stipulated that the defendant:
"Should contribute the sum of $30.00 per month for
the maintenance and support of said minor child
until further order of this court." (Emphasis ours.)
The same language, "until further Order of the Court" was
used in the instant Decree of Divorce (Defendant's Exhibit
After an extensive review of the cases in point, including the Moyle decision, the Wyoming court determined at
page 848 that:
"The same will, and does, survive his death, even
under a Decree imposing the same 'until further
order of the Court/ "
In Bailey v. Bailey, 471 P. 2d 220 (Nev., 1970), the
Nevada Supreme Court was faced with the same problem
and took cognizance of the Moyle decision in arriving at
its conclusion. At page 222, the court stated:
"Other courts have permitted child support decrees
to be enforced against a decedent's estate without
his consent. In Murphy v. Moyle . . . a decision to
that effect was grounded in a divorce statute giving
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the court power to make such provision for the
children 'as may be just and equitable' ".
The court also looked at Newman v. Burwell,
and stated:

infra,

"We decline, however to follow the lead of California and Utah and hold that an order granting
child support until further order of the Court or
during minority is such an exercise of discretion."
The Nevada court recognized that Murphy v. Moyle, infra,
is still the law in Utah, but based its decision on the theory
that if a judicial decree is to be held to impose upon the
father a greater duty of child support than that required
by common law, the decree must specifically state that such
obligation is to survive the death of the obligor.
The most recent interpretation of the Moyle decision
in Utah is found in Callister v. Callister, 261 P. 2d 944, 947
(Utah, 1953), where the Court held:
"It is true that in that case (Moyle) the claim made
against the deceased husband's estate was for support of a minor child, but the opinion expressed as
to the power of the court under the statute to award
alimony to continue after the death of the husband
appears to be supported by the weight of judicial
authority."
Although this case dealt with alimony as opposed to child
support, it reiterated the basic proposition of Moyle that
an obligation based upon a Decree of Divorce whether for
alimony or for child support, survives as a claim against
the deceased's estate.
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POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE MATERIALLY CHANGED IN FAVOR OF FRANK V.
COLOMBO, JR., SINCE THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record as to the
extent and amount of any social security support payments
currently being made to Virginia Von Storch as Guardian
of the Person and Estate of Frank V. Colombo, Jr.
In addition, there is absolutely no evidence in the record as to whether Frank V. Colombo, Jr., received the Columbine Coal Company stock referred to in the Judgment
Roll, page 42. Mr. LeFevre stated that he did not have any
record that showed that Dr. Colombo ever distributed the
stock to Frank V. Colombo, Jr. (TR-17).
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY
WITH FRANK V. COLOMBO, JR. AS BENEFICIARY WAS SUFFICIENT REASON TO
TERMINATE DR. FRANK V. COLOMBO'S
DUTY TO SUPPORT HIS SON AFTER DEATH.
The Decree of Divorce stipulated in paragraph 4:
"Defendant is now carrying a life insurance policy
on his own life in the face amount of $20,000.00
with Frankie Colombo as beneficiary thereunder.
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Defendant shall continue to keep said policy in
force with said Frankie Colombo as the beneficiary until such time as said child has completed
his college or other educational training."
Dr. Colombo, prior to the divorce, was maintaining the
policy on his life for his son's benefit and the Divorce Decree merely stipulated that he must continue to do so. The
Decree further set forth a specific time limit for the maintenance of this policy, i.e., through the completion of his
college or other eduactional training. It seems clear that
the purpose of the life insurance policy was to insure that
Frankie V. Colombo, Jr. would have sufficient funds to
complete his advanced education should his father die before it was completed. The District Court's reasoning becomes even more apparent when considering the fact that
Dr. Colombo's other children had completed their college
educations (TR-22).
Finally, there is nothing in the Decree which would
indicate that this policy would be in lieu of monthly support
payments, but rather it appears to be in addition to monthly
support payments.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the evidence in the record, as well as
the foregoing cases and authorities, support the position
that Frank V. Colombo has a valid claim against the
estate of his deceased father, Frank V. Colombo, and
that he must receive, in the alternative (1) the sum of
$150.00 per month from February 1969 to June 1977 when
Frank V. Colombo, Jr. reaches his majority, or (2) the sum
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of $11,872.04, the present value of $15,150.00 invested at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) over the period of one
hundred and one (101) months (Judgment Roll, pages 12Respectfully submitted,

James B. Lee
Edward J. McCarthy
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
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